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FOR RELEASE OCTOBER 10, 1962 
8:00P.M., E.S.T. 
~GING EUROPE A'tm UNITED STA'rES PO~ 
Address by Se::mtor Mike M!l.nsfield (D. 1 Montane.) 
n1e Springfield Adult Educe.ti~ Council 
Springfield ~~blic Forum, The Philliys Lecture 
Technical High School, Spriugfield, Massachusetts 
Wednesday, October 10, 1962, 8:00P.M. 
w,/1 h!JIIe 
Although itAa.m taken an inordinate length of time to 
w."/1 
complete it, the recordfishow1 that the 87th Cougress has disposed 
of a substantial amount of public business. For this work, it will 
be praiseC. or blG.I:!ecl--a.t least until early NovF::mber--d.epend.ir.g in 
no srua:U part, I should think, on one's political pree.ilections. 
The Congress also failed to get through certain significant items 
of business. And for this, too, it will be praised or blamed, at 
least until early November. 
In the closing days of the 87th Congress, however, two 
major measures were cleared. Praise or b~ame and po:itical pre-
dilections : n.otwithstandic.g, these measures are of irr:mense impor-
t9.:lcs to the nation. 
I refer, first, to the foreign aid appropriation. We may 
deplore this appropriation as a waste of money, as an invitation to 
fo~eign ingratitude or worse. We may praise it as an act of far-
sie~ted bumauitarianism or enlig.~tened self-interest. 
Howe>er we may regard it, there is no escaping the fact 
that foreisn aid is a critical geer in the intricate machinery of 
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the nation's foreign relations. It has co:::J.tinued to turn, more or 
less adequately, for many years and through several administrations 
of both political parties. It is no overstatement to say that if 
the Cor~ress had removed the gear or crippled it by denying an ample 
appropriation it would have risked bringing down the entire structure 
on which the peace and security of the nation has rested for many 
years. Faced with that reality, more than a sufficient n~ber of 
Senators and Representatives were inclined to the course of prudence 
with respect to this program. Members of beth parties acted to 
sustain the security and peace of the United States. 
This is not to say that misgivings were absent on the part 
of members whc voted for foreign aid. Many e::1tertained serious doubts 
about one or more aspects of the aid-program. lv1"..a.y I say, in all 
frankness, that I personally share some of these doubts. 
I do not believe, for example, that we can or should accept 
as satisfactory for the indefinite future a course of foreign policy 
which places great reliance on a continued outflow of dollar grants 
to other nations. Nor do I believe that we should accept by force 
of habit a course of sustaining the independe:::J.ce of nations else-
wher e by mai:::J.taining aid-dependent governments in a style to which 
they may have become accustomed. Nor do I beli eve that the long-
range interests of this nation are served by casti::1g aid for the 
eco::1omic development of emergent nations, a problem which has a 
ratio:::J.ale of its own, in the framework of a competitive struggle 
between the United Stat es and the Soviet Union. 
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But t..'le intelligent resolution of these and other doubts 
does t::.ot lie in the s·udden smashing of the gear of foreign aid wit~ 
all that that implies to t~e t otal machinery of foreign policy and, 
he~ce, to our peace and security. I believe, rather, that we must 
look for the resolution of the doubts in a continuing alertness to 
the changing realities of the :.nternational sttu.atiou. We nru.st look 
for it in constructive adjustments in the foreign policies by which 
we seek to deal with these realitles. Alld we must look for it, 
f i n9.:ly, in a continuous re-ordering of both objective and adminis.l~ra­
tion iu the aid-p:rogram itself, as circumste.i·1c~s f'llsewhere and at 
ho::ne cl•.ange. In these ways we nay a!lticipate, with some realism, 
the day ~>rh3n the depende::J.cy of others on th0 more C.ubious e.nd costly 
eleme:J.ts of tbe aid.-mechl:l.llism may come to an orderly end. I:v.deed, 
we BB.Y itook forward to the day when the dependency of our mm policies 
for peace and security on these same du~ious elements may also came 
to 8.!1 orderly end. 
For this reason, among others, it seems to me that the 
Pres ident's new trade policy is the most important act of the recent 
session of the Congress. This first maj or revision of foreign trade 
poli cy si:1ce the enactment of the Reci:p:rO·..!al Trad.e Program a quarter 
of a ce:::J.t·..u-y ago places i:a the hands of the President authority to 
dea:i. ef fecti Yely with recent changes in the pat·cerns of international 
trade . The program has great significance for the continu.~d growth 
of our own domestic economy, for that growth i s now i n terwovs n w~th 
a.n expa.ndi.:g overseas tra cl.e. But even grea. ter, perb.aps, are t he 
possibilities whi ch are opened by the new trade program for placing 
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our security and well-being on a more stable and equitable and, 
hopefully, a less costly basis than that whic:1 now pre7ails. 
In this latter ~onnection, the new trade law bears a 
direct relationship to the focus of' tonight's discussion. It has 
particular relevance to Europe, to a changing Europe, and to our 
relations with that region. 
I have already referred to the need for a continuing 
alertness to the evolving situation abroad. It is essential to 
effective foreign policy that we do not imprison ourselves in a 
self-fashioned cage of outwo1~ facts and ritualistic slogans. 
Certaiuly, we ought not forget the experiences of the past. But, 
equally, we must be alert to the realities of· the present and try 
our best to cntici~ate the needs of the fu~tlre. 
This alertness is most essential with respect to ~ape. 
For Eurcpe has long been at the core of our foretgn policies, and 
Europe is changing rapic.ly. It is changing, moreover, in ways which 
a.re likely to require adjustments in policies on a scale more exten-
sive than a:ny we ha:..re lmovrn in the past decade • 
We cannot yet dAfine the adj~stme~ts which may be desirable, 
possible, or, i::ldeed, inevitable in the years ahead.. Our policies 
interact with the policies of other nations and the courses which 
they t~~e will surely affect our own. But ~ve will discern the lines 
of adjustment, and we shall have a better chance to formulate effec-
tive adjustments as we deepen our understanding of what is presently 
transpiring in Europe. 
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Those of you who have traveled from time to time on that 
continent may have been struck by the obvious manifestations of c~ange 
over the years. Indeed, a great change is readily evident in such 
siople matters as the progressive im~rovement in the dress of the 
people and the worsening of the traffic problems in the major 
E1.1!'opean cities. It is evident in the copious availability of food 
and otter consumer goods, in the general intensity of COillli).ercial and 
industrial activi~f. 
The present look o~ Western Europe, to one who saw it ten 
or fifteen years ago, is t~1at of a booming prosperity. Ana., indeed, 
the economic indicators sustain the ap~arent. Western Europe is 
prosperous, and it is dynamic. It is producing, investing, trading--
internally and externally--and consuming at uuprecedented levels. 
There is a general belief that this dynamism is d.u.e to the 
Connnon Market. T!1e fact is that mucn of the economic momentum wa.s 
generated in the European crrwntries on an essentially national but 
cooperative basis, even before ~~e Market arrangements began to go 
into effect . We may anticipate, therefore, that there is much more 
to come if the Coi!ltlon Mark.et continues to live up to its initial 
promise a:x:d, if the cooperative concepts of the Merltet are ex-tended 
outward to other nations. 
In any event, the atmosphere of Western Europe in 1962 makes 
it difficult to recall the Europe of 1945--the devastated Europe, 
st·LUJ.ned by long years of privation, by the incredible brutality and 
massive destructiveness of the war. It is difficult, even, to recall 
the Europe of 1950 or 1951--the ~~ape struggling to its feet with the 
help of the Marshall Plan. 
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Difficult though it may be, it is essential that we recall 
these earlier Europes. For it was in those settings that our basic 
postwar comprehe!lSions of the E1.1ropean si tu.ation were formed, compre-
hensiO'.lS which persist to some extent even today although circumstances 
have changed greatly. 
We saw Western. Europe, then, as hurt almost beyond help, 
threatened by revol·Lttiona.ry upheaval from within a.nd aggression from 
without. We saw Western Europe dependent on this natiGn for its very 
subsistence, let alone t..he revival or survival of its f:::-eedom. And 
after the Berlin blockade, we saw &trope, as a whole, split beyond 
any expectation of healing between the monolithic oppressive Stalinist 
system in the Fast and the revivtng free nations of the West. And 
we saw, in a divided Germany the wedge of a deepening division in a 
nation and a continent. 
Throug~out the early postwar years, our policies were reason-
ably attuned to the reali"i~ier. of the Europea!l si taation. They were 
policies which could pro:i:lce mere a.:nd more ve~.ement slogans of libera-
tion, more and !!lore speeches in the Congress on liberation, but, 
unfortunately, not the act._.a.::.J.ty ot a liberation in Eastern Europe, 
as we saw with striking cla .c-:!:cy at the time of the Hungarian uprising. 
But they were po::!.icies w·h~cl':. : with less end less fanf'are, were appro-
priate to the restoration of !.;estern Germany, the recovery of Western 
Europe and to the protection of its renewed vitality and freedom. 
Western Europe readily accepted our leadership in those 
years. Cynics might note that the Europeans had little choice. But 
I prefer to think that our leadership was accepted in major part because 
it was an understanding , effective and responsible leadership. We 
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pursued policies which Western Europeans recognized as serving their 
interests and policies rrhich served our own interests, by safeguarding 
the security, tile peace, the progress--the essential well-being--of the 
people of the United States, at a realistic and bearable cost. 
As I have noted, attitudes tend to persist even after the 
circumstances which give rise to them have changed. National policies 
and adwinistration are subject at least to the same inertia. If we 
wmlld deal effectively with the Europe of 1962, therefore, we must now 
grasp firmly the fact that we are no longer dealing with the Europe of 
1945 or 1950. In Western Europe, we are no longer dealing--to be blunt--
wi·ch the gaunt and shabby economic dependent, the shocked, tottering 
and willing dependent of the earlier years. On the contrary, Western 
Europa , today, is on its feet and has been for several years. More, 
it is running. 
Indeed there are certain aspects of the change which has 
taken place which border on the ironic. ~uropean currencies, for 
exa.r;:rple, were once in little dE:mand in the international financial 
markets . Some of these currencies are now in relatively greater 
demand than our own. Not so long ago we legislated inducements to 
E:ncourage American enterprise to invest in Western :Ela·ope and fmmd 
very few takers . Now we are concerned and properly so by the great out-
flow of American capital to thet region, and we are seeking to stimulate 
vlestern European investment in this countr.r as a partial counterbalance. 
Once we were badgered for loans by Western Europeans. In recent years 
we ha~le been seeking a speedup in repayment of various obligations and 
what is more, the Europeans have been repaying in advance. Once we 
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placed abroad, as far as possible, orders for arms ann ~unitions and 
other materiel for NATO. Now, we are pressing the European allies to 
make their military purchases irJ. the United States as a means of obtain-
ing foreign exchange to off~set the dollar-outflow involved in keeping 
our military forces in ~Jrope. 
I do not cite these examples in dismay or alarm. ~1e recovery 
and prosperity of Western Europe were the enQs w~ich we sought because 
our WJ.tione.l in·cerests are interwoYen with these ends. Moreover, the 
interrJ.P..tioD.al financial position of the United States is one of great 
reserves and in the past year this position has apparently strengthened. 
I cite t'he unusual and ironic t".lrnabouts, rather to indicate the extent 
to v/hich ec.:onomic cir'=!w:nstances have ch!:l.nged in Wcster:n Ei.'.:"Ope. 
lbe transition has not been s~dden. And as it has taken place, 
our. policies--sooner or later .. -have genero.lly adjusted to the changes. 
Some of the exanrples '¥hich I have just cited are representative of 
specific adjustments. But in more general terms, we might note that 
the policies of postwar relief to a stricken Europe, the poetwa.r loans, 
the Marshall Plan, have long since passed. into history . With the excep-
tion of Spain, no economic aiel of any kind. has been extended to Western 
Europe for several years. 
From one-sided economic aid, i~ short, we have progressed to 
a vastly expanded two-way trade--regular commercial t:::-ade. This trade 
has flourished, and it now encompasses one-third of our total trane, 
$5.3 billion in exports to Western Europe, and $4.7 billion in imports 
from Western Europe in 1961. Compare these figures with a pre-war trade 
whic~, in 1938 stood at $1.2 billion in exports and $474 million in 
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imports. Apart from its other virtues, the Marshall Plan was a key 
~actor in bringing abcut this immensely and mutually advantageous 
growth in trade. 
It is doubtful, however, that we can coast indefinitely in 
this satisfactory situation even if we so desired. It is not likely 
that we shall be able to avoid difficulties in the period ahead in 
our relations with Western Europe. The basic question which is loom-
ing is whether a surge forward in Western cooperation, notably in 
trade, is now possible, indeed, necessary. 
The major decisions i~ this connection cannot long be avoided. 
Indeed, Western Europe is moving towar ds them largely on a self-generated 
momentum. The Inner Six countries- ~Ger::nany, France, Ital:r, Belgium, 
Netherlands and Luxembourg--are impelled by the high initial effective-
ness of the Cammon Market into a speedup in the removal of economic 
impediments as among themselves. As a group, moreover, they are at a 
point at which there wi ll be a signifi,:;ant step forward in the freeing 
of trade with nations outside the Market or ti:e heightening of restric-
tions on that trade. Moreover, the very success of the Common Market 
appears to be serving as a sti!!lt.t,_us to integrated and quasi-independent 
European action on other rua . c .. -~rs , particularly on the part of the core 
nations of Western Gernany a:.:.t F-rance. And the resolution of the 
Algerian question is likely to increase this stimulus. 
Britain and other Western European nations linked in the Free 
Trade Area commonly called the Outer Seven, are also carried toward 
major decisions largely by the significance of the Co~on Market to 
their trade. They are drawn by both the great promise and the uncertain 
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prospects with which the Market confronts them. And finally, we are 
impelled towards major decisions not only by considerations of trade 
but because of the key position which all of Western Europe--and a 
changing EtiTope--occupies in the structure of policy upon which our 
peace and security depends. 
We find OQTselves, in short, in a period of major transi-
tion in Western Europe during which many questions, economic and more 
than econo:n:ic, are appearing and demanding answers. vle do not yet 
know all the questions, let alone the answers. For it does not rest 
with ·us alone to pose the one or to compose the other. 
It is in this context that the action of the Congress in 
enacting into law· the President's new trade program assumes great 
importance to the nation. In a most responsible and non-partisan 
achievement and by overwhelming vote the Cougress has equipped the 
President to deal with the several possibilities which are emerging, 
all of which have great significance for the nation's security, peace 
and well-being. 
It is easy enough to visualize these possibilities in an 
optimistic light. One might look ahead, for example, to the entry of 
the United Kingdom and other European nations into the Common Market 
or, in other ways, the devising of satisfactory trade arrangements 
between the Inner Six e.nd Outer Seven of Europe so that they will not 
find themselves at sixes and sevens. One might look ahead, too, to 
the immense possibilities of trade-growth between this nation and all 
of Western Europe, through the reciprocal removal of trade barriers, 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 41, Folder 51, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
- 11 -
in the Organization :for Economic Cooperation and Development, under the 
General Agreement for Tariffs and Trade and in other ways. 
Indeed these optimistic possibilities are now open. But in 
all realism we must recognize that they are not the only possibilities. 
In this connection, I would point to the difficulties which have arisen 
in the course of British negotiation for membership in the Common Market. 
It is understandable that there should be difficulties and cautions on 
both sides in these negotiations. But the hesitancies should not be 
dismissed by the glib assertion that it is just a matter of Britain 
"wantj_ng the cake and eating it too." There is more involved- -much more. 
And much of what is involved is concerned with the Commonwealth. 
We will do well to remember that the Commonwealth, whatever its short-
comi:ilgs, remains a signific&nt factor for restraint and order and the 
evolution of freedom in a world which is never far from chaos and filled 
with tyranny. It is to be hoped, therefore, that arrangements will be 
~evised which permit reconciliation of new British ties with Western 
Earope with the maintenance of the Commonwealth. For such a reconcilia-
tion may well decide whether present trends in Western Europe will turn 
inward or outward, towards seclusion or inclusion, in the direction of 
fragmentation or toward more sffecti ve cooperation among all the free 
D.ations in meeting the worldwide problems of freedom . 
If the coming transition in Western Europe will require adjust-
ments in our economic policies it is not unlikely that it will require 
adjus t ments in political and defense policies. Again, it is possible 
to view the possibilities in a most optimistic light. We might assmne, 
for example, that the great economic progress of Western Europe might 
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produce a stea~v closing of political as well as economic ranks and the 
development of more effective common approaches towards Easte~ Europe 
and the SoViet Union, and towards all the issues involved in a common 
advance of freedom throughout the world. One might also assume the con-
tinuation and deepening of military coopeJation ur1der NATO, with the Eu-
ropeans bearing an increased share of its costs in manpower and materiel, 
commensurate with the improvement in their economic situation. 
Yet, we would not see the present situation f ·lzlly if we did 
not also note certain tendencies which suggest alternative possibilities. 
We must note, for example, that Western policies with regard to China 
and other parts of the Far East are by no means parallel policies, let 
alone common policies, and the gap vrhich has existed for years shows no 
sign of closing. That may be understandable inasmuch as the Far East 
has become increasingly remote from the concern of Western Europe even 
as it has co::ne closer to ours . But near at hand, vre cannot ignore the 
fact that the profitable trevie ano. shipping enticements which have existed 
since the breakdown in ot~ relatio~ships with Cuba have proved too much 
for some NATO rue~bers to resist. Again, I suppose one might rationalize 
this situation by noting that many of the NATO members are maritime 
nations and, as such, have traditional reluctances or legal restraints 
against introducing impediments to commerce on the seas, and further, 
that Cuba is somewhat remote from their immediate interests. 
But even more directly, in the North Atlantic relationship 
itself, a relationship in which, presumably, the security and other 
interests of the European members are at least equally and probably 
more at stake, we cannot fail to notice certain anomalous tendencies. 
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There are obvious differences over nuclear strategy which far from 
being resolved, appear to be deepening. Further, it is yaars since 
NATO established a force goal of thirty divisions in Western Europe. 
At the present time, however, there are only twenty-three divisions 
in the region, and so far as I am aware, the only increments to its 
strength in the past half-decade have come from the United States 
and Weat Germany which now supplies half of the European contingent. 
This is the case despite the fact that economic growth thro~ghout 
Wester~ Eurcpe would appear to equip the nations of that region to 
increase their expenditures for the common defense and permit us to 
reduce o".lrs . 
In this instance, we are confronted with an almost inescap-
able concl~sion that the Western European allies are either most 
lackadaisical about their sGcurity or they see the military threat 
to the North Atlantic region or at least to ~lestern E'urope in a far 
different perspective than do we. 
This conclusion, moreover, is reinforced by ~other anomaly 
in the current situation. I allude to it by pointing out that much of 
the discussion of foreign policy in the last Congress, as in its pre-
decessors, revealed a contiw~ed deep ideological hostility and security 
concern with respect to any and all relations with Eastern Europe. The 
Congressional concern included Yugoslavia and Poland despite the fact 
the Presidents of botn parties thro~hout the years have u:ged a some-
what different approach at Jeast to these two Eastern Europeau nations. 
With this exception and despite occasional short-lived efforts 
to impro7e the tone of United States-Soviet relations--as for example 
during the Geneva Conference of 1955 and when the"Spirit of Camp David" 
1 
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prevailed--our relations with Eastern Ecrope have, in fact, been extremely 
limited, involving minimal diplomatic an~ cultural contact and small-scale-
in some instances--trivial trade. The closed-door situation in the East 
European Communist countries, of course, has been a factor in this situa-
tion. At the tiree the Marshall Plan was proposed, for example, the 
Etistern ~~opean governments under Stalin's dictation isolated themselves 
almost completely from contact with the West. But it is also true that 
we i~osed, as a matter of policy, our own ~uasi-~uarantine on relations 
with that region and have retained it through the years. The principal 
motives, ap:9are::1tly, have been a belief that any other cou.rse would 
adYersely affe~t the security of the West and the hope that ~uasi­
q_uarantine would contribute to a liberation of the Eastern European 
people from oppressive Communist governments. 
In auy eve:at, our policies with respect to Eastern Europe 
have involved stringent trade controls for many yecrs. These controls 
have acted to keep our commerce vnth all of the Eastern European 
coun triea at a very low level. Ex.clus i ve of trade with Poland and 
Y1.4gosle.v"i.a, it has amounted to U!:l.der <)>1 00 million a year. Aud the 
great bulk of the $100 mi:i.lio:Q. consists of trade wi~~h the So,.riet Union. 
By contrast, our commerce with YugoslaYia and Poland, unfolding ur..der a 
somewhat eased policy, came to over $300 !!'Jillion ln 1961. 
It would reasonable to ass,~!Ile that a parallel policy towards 
Eastern Earope would pre-v-ail a:nong Qi.lr NATO allies . They are closer 
tc the source of danger, sharing the control of the continent with the 
Communj_st governments. Their stake in the security of the West and the 
liberation of Eastern Europe would appear at least equal to our own. 
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But we look in vein, if we look for parallel policies. With the Soviet 
Union alone, for example, the trade of the NATO nations of Europe 
amounted to over $1.5 billion in 1961. And the trade of our NATO allies 
with Eastern European countries, exclusive of the Soviet Union, in the 
same year came to a total of over $2 billion. 
Indeed, in the case of West Gei'lliB.IlY, trade with East German,y 
has been about $500 million a year for the past five years. West German 
trade with the Soviet Union alone amounted to $400 million in 1961, equal 
to our total trade with all of Eastern Eurqpe, including Y11goslavia and 
Poland. 
Moreover, the trade figurE>s are a bare-bones indicator of the 
extent of increasing contact between West and East Europe. Add to it, 
a growing i~tra-Ruropean tourism. Add to it, the spread of commercial 
aviation networks unt il they embrace both parts of Europe and include 
principal European ca:rriers. Add to tt the direct rail service now 
available be~ween M~scow and Rome, Paris and London. Add to it new 
credit agreements and sea-going shipping arra~gements which facilitate 
the flow of trade between the two parts of Europe. 
What begins to emerge from these and other indicators is a 
far different portrait of t l:e all-European situation than that which 
prevailed a decade or more ego, the period in which our general com-
prehensions were formed and our basic political and defensive policies 
established. The contemporary portrait hardly suggests a Western Europe 
cowering with fear before the threat of' imminent Soviet invasion, or 
subversion from Eastern Europe. It hardly suggests a Britain, Germany, 
France, or Italy which hold that the way to induce change in Eastern 
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~rope is to isolate it. It hardly suggests W~steru Europe s tendi~ 
f i rm or e-ren sta!ldin.g still, i:lsofar as contact with Easter~ Et1rope 
is concerned. 
On the contrery, the current sit~lation appears to be that 
of a Europe which ~ it may be separated on i1eologica1Jines is 
fi udj r.g, through an extensive coi!lii'erce and other contacts, a tolerable 
way to live with the division. This is a far o.ifferent Europe than 
thn.t w~.ich exis+.ed a.t the time 01.1r !>r esent ;poHcies of gua.si-~t'a.nt:ine 
of Easte!'n Euroue were devised. It is a far dHferent Europe than that 
which is suggested by the situation in Berlin in 1vhi. ch the Fnited States 
and the Soviet Union confront each other in a continuo~s state of incipi-
ent conflict. 
It is a Europe, i:-:1 short, which appears to ha-re cha.nged 
markedly in a decade, except a·c Berlin. So much has it changed that 
it suggests the desirability of a critical examination of both our com-
prehensions of the situation and the policies which are derived from 
them to determine whether both may have fallen somewhat behind the times. 
We will not serve our own interests if we cloak the realities of the 
present situation j.n the factsand slogans of the pe.st . Policies per-
sisted in long after ci!'cumstances alter risk irrelevancy or worse. 
Certainly, we ought never to approach changes in foreign 
policy lightly. Neither ought we to fear them. We mu.st always be 
prepared to seek them if, in the light of altered situations, changes 
may be i~dicated in terms of cur own security, peace and well-being. 
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In the end, it is the President who has the awesome responsi-
bility of decision in these matters. But I have long believed that any 
PresiQent gains from thoughtful public consideration of foreign policy. 
Nor is such consideration impossible in this country until after 
November, as Mr. Khrushchev appears to think. Tne questions involved 
in our relations with the rest of the world are not political; they are 
nstional. The people of t~is nation have long since shown a capacity 
to separate the two and, in time, to deal with those in public life who 
fail to separate them. It is with continued confidence in that capacity, 
therefore, that I suggest to you some aspects of the European situation 
and our policies, which are in need of thorough and dispassionate public 
examination. 
1. It does net seem to :me unrflasonalbe, for. ex.ai!Jl?le, to anti-
cipate that the impact cf the economic transition in vlestern Europe is 
bound to be felt, not only in econo~ic matters, but throughout the 
structure of ivestern cooperation. It seems to me, further, that our 
or:~ce ;preuonderant position of responsibility m-ust evolve into a greater 
shar~g of responsibility in line with the diminishing diff~~~ 
bet-.reen the basic capacities of the E"cl.J"Opeezls anC. om·selves as the 
effect of WorlQ War II on E-u.:;:-ope recedes into his'.:.m·y. T'r.ere is no 
failure of leadership in adjustment~ this reality. Rather, it is an 
essential of leadership. It would, indeed, be a failure if -.re were to 
cling to an excessive responsibility in Westarn affairs on a mistaken 
assumption that nothing has ch~ged and the need for us is little dif-
ferent tha~ it ever was and that special sacrifices on our part must 
conti~ue. I~ that presumptive course lies not only unnecessary tension 
but 1:-llnecessary cost a...."ld U!lnecessary risk for the sec'tlri ty of our own 
people. 
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More suitable to the present, it seems to me, is the course 
of a less ritualistic p~suit and, at the same time, a more realistic 
pursuit of interdependence among the Western nations on the basis of 
a more proximate equality of benefit and sacrifice in our relations. 
We may begin to find such a course through the new trade program and 
a great expansion of trade, not onlY with the Common Market but with 
all the Western Eu.rcpea.n nations. Certainly, that is precisely what 
the policy is designed to permit, and I have no doubt that the Presi-
dent will pursue it with vigor. But we need to be prepared for some 
very hard and difficult barc5a.ii:'ling in the days ahead. We must be pre-
pared to look to our national needs with the same frank concern as do 
others. Unless we are so prepared we may well find ourselves continu-
ing to carry more of the burdens of inte1•dependence while enjoying 
less of its benefits. We will do well, too, to make certain that the 
trade interests of Latin America, Japan and other nations with whom 
close and fortuitous relations are enjoyed, are not shunted aside in 
the effort to strengthen the ties across the Atlantic. 
2. If the beginnings of the adjustments of our course are 
to be found in the new trade program, they are not likely to end with 
that program. For, I do not; : hjnk that we can discount for much longer 
the existence of Wes tern Eur<~·ean concepts of security needs which 
differ considerably from our own. Nor can we ignore the continued 
reluctance of Western Europe~ goveraments to increase their sacrifices 
for the common defense in the patterns which were determined some years 
a6o· 
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~y I say the Europeans have an equal right to their views 
as to what may presently be necessary to_ their defense, to the common 
NA10 defense, and every consideration should be given to their views. 
B~t equally, we have a right and a responsibility to examine the extent 
of our commitment to the common defense, particularly in view of the 
fcilure to reach the NATO force goals,in view of the consistent balance 
of payments deficits which we have experienced for several years, in 
view of the expended European capacity to b~ar a larger share of the 
commcn costs if they were so inclined, and in view of the enormous 
burden of assistance which we have carried and are carryi~g, largely 
alone, with respect to other areas of the world. It would appear to 
me that, at the least, the time is al:>:-eady past due when the remaining 
military aid-programs to Western E'..1rope shou.ld follow the economic aid 
programs into history. Nor is it unreasonable to consider ~tion 
in our expensive ground-force commitment to Europe--both in manpower 
and in dollars--if a reduction might be negotiated for a reciprocal 
1·ri t!'ld:raKal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe. Any such reduction 
is, of course, inseparable from a sat.is_factory an.d enduring resolution 
of the Berlin question. Otherwise, we would be in the impossible situa-
tion of reducing forces in Europe one oay onl.y to have to increase them 
the next. 
3. Prospects for any such course are also partially dependent 
on the situation in Eastern Et~ope. And it is difficult to speak of the 
present situation in that region with any precision. Our public sources 
of information are somewhat limited, to aay the least. Nevertheless 
policies which still derive from an interpretation of that region as 
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the Soviet monolith which it was in Stalin's day seem to me to be open 
to question. Certainly, Eastern Eur-ope r~me.ins an area of preponderant 
Soviet in:'luence. Certainly, Commu~1ist nations of the region are linked 
in the Warsaw Pact. But it is hardly accurate to see the Soviet rela-
tionship with Finland and with Poland in the same perspective; nor is 
it valid to equate the Soviet relationship with East Germany and with 
Yugoslavia, nor the Soviet relationship with Poland and with Bulgaria, 
Rumania or Albania. Indeed, tb.e latter count:-y has actually severed 
diplomatic relations with the So\~et Union and sent its military mission 
packing! 
What ~~."!??.z if anY.:, these a::ld other differences in Eastern 
Europe may have to the peace and we~a:-e of the United States is an 
open question. But nothing is gained by closing our eyes to the fact 
that differences do exist or by regarding as sacrosanct policies which 
derive from earlier ass1u~tions with regard to the region from the Baltic 
to the Black Sea. 
On that basis alone, tha policies which we ha.ve purs'l:ed more 
or less consistently with all of Eastern Europe except Finland and to 
a lesser extent with Yugoslavia and Poland for a decade and a half clearly 
require careful scrutiny. ~~e~ we consider, further, that NATO trade 
with Eastern Europe has risen to a level of $3.5 billion and other East-
\vest European relationships have greatly expanded, while we have continued 
to maintain a quasi-quarantine, the need for thoughtful review becomes 
even more evident. 
I would reiterate that prospects for an orderly improvement 
of our policies with respect to Europe or, at least, a safe reduction 
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in their burdens on the public, are likely to nrove remote so long as 
there is a continuance of the prese~t tcncion i~ Be~lin. 
It is the policy and, by this .... ... :ur:e, it should. be clear to 
all that it is tne policy of the United States neither to be provoked 
into unnecessa~:y ~~t' nor to s'..l!'render Allied rights in Berlin to force. 
Whatever is neces:=8.ry to assert that policy will be done. But let there 
be no mist.a.~te s.s "to the cost of that si tua.tion to this nation. The 
increase of severe.l billions in the <lefense budget in the :!..ast two years 
was closely rele.teC. to it. The call-up of Nat~onal Guan1Pwcn and 
Reserve co!!IO._SEJ.E_Z_: r.a J e.s t year wa.s dire·.::t;lY related to it. The grant of 
standby authority to the President to do the same this year is related 
to it. 
I would point out, further, that the rights which we are seek-
ing to safegua~d in B~r~in a~e Allied rights even though the principal 
responcibili ty a.nl co~'t_ for ~holr:l.:ii.i G...J;h<)m has besn borne by this nation 
since 1948. It Eeems to m~ ~.hu-tL-~~_::~he li.gl:t ~f the alte::..·ed situation 
in Europe, -.,e ;rra;r properq_t_:1qi1~xe __ wt:~t!!_9r -r,J.;::_ Ee-:-lin situation today 
is not at lee.st as nrJ:~h a respons:!.bili ty of the Germans and the Europeans 
as it is of ~he l;ni ted 8-T:~;. ~_.:>R. w~ r..'B.y properly inquire, whether or not 
in view of t::-.e c:e.tastroyhi.:__~.::l~l2.i~a.tio:ns wbic·h this si tua.tion contains, 
it has not beco~n~, to some _::_~t.~:mt, a worldwide r~onsibility to share. 
It would s.pEear to rr.e that we have every right to insist that 
those whose interests nre a~ least as directly involved as ours bear 
more equitabl;y- the risks and "osts wcich are involved. At the least, 
it would app~ar to me that they join in an effort to find a rational 
alternative to this dangerous and costly si t:•.l8.tion, by such honorable 
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means as may be open, be it by di~~.Pe i ~ th::."ough the United Nations 
or through conferences on Ge:cmaqr at whi•:-.h t !]e Eu?:"opean nt:.tions who may 
be prepared to contribtlte, as well e.s Gerllia:lls, might be ;::>resent. Indeed, 
it is not at &.1:1 in!:L.EJ2ropriate -ljhat both the Unit9d States and the Soviet 
Un5.on mo· .. "B :f·.l.-rt!.1e:r b~.cl';: i:n such negotia.tions while the .Etzopeans them-
selves make a _gre~.t~~r e:'fort to find answers to the problems posed at 
In. a.ny event~ I do not believe that we shoulcl be dissuaded 
from seeking more :r::..t.::_,_)r;,a.l 1:i'as ·;;~:r-s t.o t.he Be:r.lin clilemno. w .d related 
questions by the r-a~~]-.0:, eyc·t;:9"rs or the relat:i.vely cost-free reticences 
of others, so long_~~ we contir.::~e to bee:.:- the preponderant burden of cost 
and res;ponsi'bility. 
To s"tB.nd firm while circ'l.l!llStances move on is not to stand 
firm at all. It is to !~~~~~-i~~o irrelevenc~ and a frustrating 
or a war of mutue.l anihile.tion. ~L'::J:..' Pr es :!.G.ent L'..eserYes to be sustained 
at home and b·.r allies n.broa d. aB he e~_e;ages i::J. a.n Uill'emi tting search for 
a better a·':ls'\.,.er to t!1e dilem:1a. And the hour is indeed already very 
late in Be::..-lin. 
I ha-,re discussed t :1ese matters with you, tonight, notwith-
standing the fact that the wl~ds of October have already begun to kindle 
the political fires of November. I have felt free to do so because 
these questions of a changi ng Europe and our foreign policies will be 
with us all regardless of the outcome of the election. 
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Witi1 the Preside~t remains the awes~~e responsibility of 
decision. He will have to make the decisions--decisions on which 
hinge the security, the peace and the well-being of generations. 
In all frankness, the decisions which are reached with regard to 
foreign policy are not likely to differ significantly whatever the 
politieal composition of the next Congress. In these national 
matters, I am confitent that President Kennedy will continue to 
have the support of t~e preponderance of the membership of Congress, 
as did his predecessor. And I am confident, too, that he will have 
the preponderant su~port of the people of the United States. 
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